bmad-os-gh-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub issue titles and bodies via the
gh issue listcommand inSKILL.md. This content is then passed to sub-agents for analysis inStep 3using the template inagent-prompt.md. While the prompt uses structured JSON output and deep analysis instructions to reduce accidental obedience, it lacks explicit boundary markers (e.g., XML tags or delimiters) to separate the untrusted issue text from the agent instructions. An attacker could embed malicious instructions within a GitHub issue to influence the triage report or suggested bulk actions. Findings for this category are always low severity. - Ingestion points:
gh issue list --json number,title,body,labelsinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; issue content is interpolated directly into
[Paste the batch of issues here]inagent-prompt.md. - Capability inventory: Uses
Bashtool forghcommands andTasktool for sub-agent creation inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of issue body content before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
ghCLI via the Bash tool to fetch issues and suggestsgh issue closecommands in the final report for triage actions. While these are documented as intended functionality for issue management, they represent the execution of external commands based on the analyzed data.
Audit Metadata