bmad-cis-design-thinking
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python script using
uv runat both the start and end of the workflow. The script path is{project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.py, which is resolved relative to the project working directory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The activation sequence involves executing instructions defined in
activation_steps_prependandactivation_steps_append. These steps are loaded fromcustomize.tomland potentially from team or user override files, allowing for dynamic instruction execution based on local configuration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from multiple external sources and user inputs to guide its workflow, representing a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. • Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from
design-methods.csv,config.yaml, and multiple customization TOML files. Thepersistent_factsfeature also allows loading content via file globs. • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within these data sources. • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution viauv run, arbitrary file reading within the project scope, and writing output files to the filesystem. • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation, escaping, or filtering for data retrieved from external files before it is processed or interpolated into prompts.
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