bmad-cis-design-thinking

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local Python script using uv run at both the start and end of the workflow. The script path is {project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.py, which is resolved relative to the project working directory.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The activation sequence involves executing instructions defined in activation_steps_prepend and activation_steps_append. These steps are loaded from customize.toml and potentially from team or user override files, allowing for dynamic instruction execution based on local configuration.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from multiple external sources and user inputs to guide its workflow, representing a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. • Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from design-methods.csv, config.yaml, and multiple customization TOML files. The persistent_facts feature also allows loading content via file globs. • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within these data sources. • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution via uv run, arbitrary file reading within the project scope, and writing output files to the filesystem. • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation, escaping, or filtering for data retrieved from external files before it is processed or interpolated into prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 22, 2026, 02:02 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — bmad-cis-design-thinking