ai-multimodal
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/media_optimizer.pyuses theeval()function to parse frame rate strings (e.g., "30/1") returned byffprobe. While this is intended to calculate numeric values from fractional metadata, usingevalon any data extracted from file metadata is a sub-optimal practice that could theoretically be exploited if the underlying media utility output is compromised. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a significant surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted external media (images, audio, video, and PDFs). Instructions embedded within these files could potentially be interpreted by the multimodal LLM (Gemini) and passed back to the agent, influencing subsequent actions like shell command execution or file modifications.
- Ingestion points:
gemini_batch_process.pyanddocument_converter.pytake untrusted files via the--filesand--inputarguments. - Boundary markers: Prompts generally lack strict boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the media content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write, andEdittools, creating a risk if the LLM output is auto-executed by the agent. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of text extracted from media before it is returned to the agent context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/media_optimizer.pyscript executes system commands (ffmpegandffprobe) usingsubprocess.run. The implementation uses list-based arguments withoutshell=True, which is a secure way to handle external processes, but users should be aware that the skill relies on the presence and execution of these binary tools.
Audit Metadata