atlassian-rest
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external Jira issues and Confluence pages and has the capability to create or modify content on those platforms. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a ticket or page could influence the agent's behavior during workflows like status report generation or task extraction.
- Ingestion points:
confluence.mjs get-page,jira.mjs get,jira.mjs search(specified inSKILL.mdand various workflow files). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not explicitly prompt the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the retrieved Atlassian content.
- Capability inventory:
jira.mjs create,jira.mjs edit,confluence.mjs create-page,confluence.mjs update-pageacross all script files. - Sanitization: Uses the
markedandmarklassianlibraries to convert markdown to platform-specific formats (ADF/XHTML), providing structural validation but not semantic instruction filtering. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
execFileSyncinscripts/sync.mjsto execute sibling Node.js scripts (jira.mjs,confluence.mjs). While these are internal scripts, it constitutes a local command execution pattern. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically resolves the paths to its internal scripts using the current file URL to facilitate execution between modules.
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