docker-compose-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a
justfileto define and execute shell-based commands for Docker, Kubernetes (Kind/Minikube), and Podman. This provides a structured but broad command execution surface for managing infrastructure tasks. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
references/ci-cd.md, a Go helper snippet usesos/execto programmatically spawndocker composecommands. This is used for creating unique, isolated project environments during E2E testing. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The development configuration in
docker-compose.dev.ymlincludessecurity_opt: ["seccomp:unconfined"]andcap_add: ["SYS_PTRACE"]. While these settings weaken container isolation, they are documented as necessary requirements for using the Delve debugger in Go development environments. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill's templates contain hardcoded default credentials (e.g.,
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: secretandpostgres://test:test@postgres-test:5432/testdb). These are scoped to local development and ephemeral test environments and are consistent with standard developer practices for non-production setups. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to parse and act upon local project files such as
justfileanddocker-compose.yml, creating a surface where malicious instructions in a repository could influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points: Local configuration files including
justfile,docker-compose.yml, andDockerfile. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill relies on the integrity of the local workspace files.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via
just,kubectl,docker, andpodman, as well as process spawning in Go code. - Sanitization: Absent; infrastructure commands are executed directly as defined in the project files.
Audit Metadata