mcpc
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to access sensitive authentication information stored in specific local files, notably
~/.config/environment.d/secrets.conffor theZAI_AUTH_TOKEN, and references the use of environment variables likeMINIMAX_CODING_KEYfor server authentication. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill recommends executing code from remote sources at runtime using package runners. Evidence includes instructions to use
uvx minimax-coding-plan-mcpandnpx @z_ai/mcp-serverto initialize MCP server sessions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is centered on instructing the agent to generate and execute shell commands using the
mcpcCLI tool for interacting with MCP servers, which includes managing sessions and calling arbitrary tools. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill demonstrates patterns for passing sensitive bearer tokens to external URLs via command-line arguments, such as
mcpc connect mcp.example.com @api --header "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN". - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a workflow for processing untrusted data from external sources, which constitutes an injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: Tools like
web_search_prime,webReader, andsearxng_web_searchingest external internet content into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions for using delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the external content fetched by tools.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted shell-level access via the
mcpcCLI, allowing for network communication and access to local configuration files. - Sanitization: The skill lacks instructions for sanitizing or validating tool outputs before the agent processes them.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata