bmob-mcp
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill uses an unencrypted HTTP endpoint (
http://mcp.bmobapp.com/mcp) for its MCP server. This causes sensitive credentials, specificallyX-Bmob-Application-IdandX-Bmob-REST-API-Key, to be transmitted in plain text, making them vulnerable to interception on the network. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
deploy_static_sitetool instructs the agent to immediately execute shell commands provided by the remote MCP server (e.g.,curl --data-binary @filePath). This creates a pattern where the agent acts as a remote command executor for the server's output. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the synchronization and deployment of cloud function source code from external endpoints (
api.codenow.cn). While these appear to be vendor-owned resources, they involve the transfer and potential execution of external code logic. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from the remote backend (schema definitions and cloud function source code).
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
get_project_tables,list_cloud_functions, andget_cloud_function(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified to separate external data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local disk (
get_cloud_function) and execute shell commands (deploy_static_site). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the data retrieved from the remote server before it is used by the agent.
Recommendations
- Contains 1 malicious URL(s) - DO NOT USE
Audit Metadata