bmz
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through its delegate architecture.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdaccepts raw user content via the{{USER_INPUT}}placeholder, which is then passed directly into the system prompts of dynamically spawned expert sub-agents. - Boundary markers: The delegation logic lacks delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple quotes) or specific 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the sub-agents when processing this input.
- Capability inventory: Sub-agents are granted access to a wide array of methodology and case study files in the
knowledge/directory to perform their analysis. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization logic to prevent users from embedding instructions that might attempt to override the sub-agents' expert personas or extract internal knowledge files.
Audit Metadata