langgraph
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a code snippet for a custom "Calculator" tool that uses the Python
eval()function to evaluate user-provided expressions. - Evidence: Found in the "Custom Tools" section of
SKILL.mdwithin thecalculatefunction definition. - Risk: Implementing
eval()on untrusted user or model-generated input creates a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands within the environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates workflows that ingest data from untrusted external sources, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdshows examples where data fromsearch_web()and user-providedmath_problemstrings are stored in the agent's state. - Boundary markers: The provided prompt templates lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when processing retrieved content.
- Capability inventory: The demonstrated nodes have access to network tools, database savers (PostgreSQL/SQLite), and tool execution functions.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization of content retrieved from search tools before it is interpolated into LLM prompts.
Audit Metadata