cutting-a-release
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute multiple local scripts and system-level CLI tools to manage the release process.
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mdinclude runningnode scripts/release/check-gsi-update-limit.mjs,node scripts/release/check-pending-backfills.mjs, andbash scripts/common/sync-version.sh. - Evidence: Use of
aws dynamodb describe-tableto verify infrastructure state andgitfor branch operations and history analysis. - Evidence: Instructions to execute Python scripts using the backend virtual environment, e.g.,
backend/.venv/bin/python backend/scripts/backfill_tool_catalog_index.py. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it requires the agent to parse and act upon data from external repository sources like git logs and diffs.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and process
git logoutput,git showdiffs, and the contents ofgsi-inventory.json,RELEASE_NOTES.md, andCHANGELOG.mdto identify changes (§5 and §6 ofSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or directives for the agent to treat content within the git history or diffs as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
bash,node,python), version control (git), and cloud infrastructure tools (awsCLI). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are defined for the information extracted from the repository's history before it is used to generate documentation or perform checks.
Audit Metadata