cutting-a-release

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directs the agent to execute multiple local scripts and system-level CLI tools to manage the release process.
  • Evidence: Instructions in SKILL.md include running node scripts/release/check-gsi-update-limit.mjs, node scripts/release/check-pending-backfills.mjs, and bash scripts/common/sync-version.sh.
  • Evidence: Use of aws dynamodb describe-table to verify infrastructure state and git for branch operations and history analysis.
  • Evidence: Instructions to execute Python scripts using the backend virtual environment, e.g., backend/.venv/bin/python backend/scripts/backfill_tool_catalog_index.py.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it requires the agent to parse and act upon data from external repository sources like git logs and diffs.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and process git log output, git show diffs, and the contents of gsi-inventory.json, RELEASE_NOTES.md, and CHANGELOG.md to identify changes (§5 and §6 of SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or directives for the agent to treat content within the git history or diffs as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (bash, node, python), version control (git), and cloud infrastructure tools (aws CLI).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are defined for the information extracted from the repository's history before it is used to generate documentation or perform checks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 09:50 PM