migrate-call-to-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill performs an automated analysis of the user's source code to extract integration details such as agent IDs and variable mappings. This ingestion of untrusted data creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in code comments or data strings could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the workflow creation process.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads local source code files in Step 1 to identify existing
/callAPI implementations. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions are defined to separate code content from the agent's internal reasoning.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
curlfor network operations, enabling it to create, modify, and publish workflows on the Bolna platform, as well as initiate real phone calls. - Sanitization: The skill uses
jqto ensure valid JSON structure when building payloads and includes a mandatory validation step using the vendor's/validateAPI endpoint to catch configuration errors before deployment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using
curlandjq. These commands are used to interact with the Bolna API for managing workflow revisions, validating definitions, and conducting test runs. These operations are within the expected scope of an API migration tool. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches agent configurations and workflow node definitions from
api.bolna.ai. These requests target the official vendor infrastructure and are necessary for the migration workflow.
Audit Metadata