academic-presentations
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires installing external components from various sources, including the
nanobananaextension from a GitHub repository (https://github.com/gemini-cli-extensions/nanobanana). It also downloads configuration and assets from well-known services, such as the Kokoro model from HuggingFace (hexgrad/Kokoro-82M) and standard packages through official registries like PyPI and Homebrew. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill installs and executes third-party code through the
gemini extensionssystem and Python environment. Specifically, thenanobananaextension and theKokoromodel are downloaded from external repositories and executed at runtime to perform image and audio generation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell commands to manage media conversion and assembly. This includes using
ffmpegfor video production,soffice(LibreOffice) for converting PPTX files to PDF, andpdftoppmfor slide image extraction. It also includes instructions for process management viapkill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external research papers and user-provided outlines to generate narration scripts and visual prompts, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Research papers and user-provided slide plans processed in Stage 1 as described in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to isolate the untrusted paper content from the agent's core processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to file writing, shell command execution (
ffmpeg,soffice), and network access via multiple TTS APIs and Gemini extensions. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the research paper content is documented before the data is interpolated into the agent's prompts.
Audit Metadata