figure-style
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes external data to generate plot labels and titles, which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection if the source data is malicious.\n
- Ingestion points: The helper functions in
kernel.py(e.g.,bar_with_points,strip_with_median,focal_palette) accept labels and numeric values from external datasets.\n - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are defined for text labels derived from data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing files to the local file system using the
savefigandsavemethods.\n - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is performed on data-derived strings before they are rendered into the figure context.\n
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's documentation suggests executing local code from
kernel.pyto initialize the environment.\n - Evidence: The
SKILL.mdfile (§Dependencies) instructs the user or agent to load the helper module viaexec(open("kernel.py").read()).\n - Context: This is a routine initialization pattern for loading local script logic in interactive coding environments and is considered a low-risk operational finding.
Audit Metadata