prove-protocol
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The protocol establishes a workflow where agents ingest data from external sources, including a 'TARGET-PIN' specification file, supporting documents, and an 'erratum channel', which may contain untrusted content.
- Ingestion points: The protocol explicitly directs agents to read from shared specification files and supporting documentation.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or security headers for separating external data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write and execute scripts, perform file system operations (journaling), and manage background processes.
- Sanitization: No specific filtering or sanitization of the input text is described, though computational results are validated against expected values.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill requires agents to generate and execute code at runtime to verify mathematical identities and perform arithmetic checks.
- Evidence: Section 1.2 describes provers drafting chains where identities are 'tied to an executed exact-arithmetic script', and Section 4a calls for building 'exact evaluators'.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The protocol instructs the agent to use shell commands for process management during long-running computations.
- Evidence: Section 3 ('Infrastructure rules') advises the agent to 'Detach all compute expected to outlive the agent's turn' using tools like 'setsid/nohup'.
Audit Metadata