atlassian-templates

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted JSON specifications and incorporates their content into generated Confluence and Jira markup, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through JSON files processed by scripts/template_scaffolder.py, scripts/template_validator.py, and scripts/template_usage_analyzer.py (e.g., assets/sample_template_spec.json).\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The scripts do not use delimiters or include instructions for the AI or downstream systems to ignore embedded commands within the template content.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill is designed to interact with corporate Atlassian instances via MCP tools such as createConfluenceContent and createJiraIssue, which can be exploited if the generated markup contains malicious instructions.\n
  • Sanitization: Absent. The Python scripts perform direct string replacement and concatenation without escaping or validating the content of the input JSON fields.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 12, 2026, 07:06 PM