context-engine
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features tools designed to ingest and process external codebase data, which constitutes a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the source files contain adversarial instructions.
- Ingestion points: The scripts
scripts/context_analyzer.py,scripts/context_pruner.py, andscripts/memory_indexer.pyall read and process text from user-specified file paths. - Boundary markers: The tools do not currently implement specific delimiters or instruction-isolation markers in their outputs.
- Capability inventory: The
scripts/context_pruner.pyutility includes file-write capabilities via the--outputflag to save pruned content. No network or subprocess execution capabilities were identified. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform explicit sanitization or escaping of the content it reads.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A heuristic detector flagged a phrase in
references/memory-and-context-editing.mdas a potential injection. This is a false positive; the content is educational documentation that explicitly warns users about the dangers of poisoned memory files and provides best practices for securing persistent agent state.
Audit Metadata