mcp-server-builder

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external OpenAPI specifications to generate tool definitions, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/openapi_converter.py reads and parses OpenAPI JSON/YAML files from the local filesystem (e.g., assets/sample_openapi.json).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used in the converter or scaffolder to isolate untrusted descriptions from the agent's system prompt.
  • Capability inventory: The resulting tools generated by this skill and the examples provided emphasize shell-based operations, file system access, and command execution (e.g., ripgrep, pnpm).
  • Sanitization: The converter sanitizes tool names using sanitize_name but passes summary and description text directly into the generated JSON definitions without content validation.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/server_scaffolder.py is capable of dynamically generating and writing TypeScript or Python source code (e.g., src/index.ts, server.py) to an output directory based on provided tool configurations. This capability assembles executable boilerplate at runtime.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided reference documentation in references/server-implementation.md contains code examples for tool handlers using child_process.execSync and subprocess.run. These templates, while intended as developer guides, include shell execution patterns (specifically the ripgrep regex search) that could be vulnerable to command injection if implemented by a user without robust input sanitization beyond the simple single-quote replacement shown.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 12, 2026, 07:06 PM