performance-profiler

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external application logs, traces, and resource snapshots (e.g., assets/sample_request_log.json, assets/sample_resources.json) to identify performance bottlenecks. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where maliciously crafted log entries could attempt to influence the agent's behavior. Evidence includes:
  • Ingestion points: JSON and JSONL log files processed by local scripts and interpreted by the agent.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit guidance on using delimiters or safety warnings when the agent reads content from external data sources.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes scripts and system tools (Clinic.js, k6, py-spy) that involve file system interaction and command execution.
  • Sanitization: While scripts parse JSON structure, the values extracted are processed by the agent without specific sanitization against instruction injection.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The documentation in references/load-testing-and-methodology.md suggests using sudo for the py-spy profiling tool on macOS to attach to running processes and bypass System Integrity Protection. While this is a standard operational requirement for the tool, it represents a privilege escalation pattern that requires elevated permissions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 16, 2026, 02:54 PM