secrets-vault-manager
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from Vault audit logs and secret inventories, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if those files contain malicious instructions meant to influence the agent's analysis.\n
- Ingestion points: Audit log files are read by
scripts/audit_log_analyzer.pyand secret inventory files are read byscripts/rotation_planner.py.\n - Boundary markers: The tools rely on standard JSON structure for parsing but do not include specific delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to separate data from the agent's instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has file system write capabilities via
scripts/vault_config_generator.py.\n - Sanitization: Data from external files is parsed using standard JSON libraries but string content is not specifically sanitized before being included in analysis reports for the agent.\n- [SAFE]: The configuration generator follows best practices by using clear 'CHANGE_ME' placeholders for all sensitive credentials in generated templates, ensuring that no real secrets are hardcoded in the skill.
Audit Metadata