offload
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The architect agent reads and interprets data from the
handoff.mdfile, including 'Gate results' and 'Open disagreements' sections populated by a separate builder agent. This ingestion of AI-generated content creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. \n - Ingestion points:
handoff.md(viahandoff.mjs section get).\n - Boundary markers: Markdown headers are used as delimiters.\n
- Capability inventory: Local file system access and shell command execution via
dispatch.sh.\n - Sanitization: Instructions in
SKILL.mdadvise ignoring narrative text, but no programmatic sanitization is applied to the ingested content.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Thedispatch.shscript dynamically constructs shell commands and writes them to temporary.shfiles for execution via front-ends likeherdrortmux. Thenotify-turn-ended.shscript also performs dynamic command chaining based on user-provided configuration.\n- [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill launches various builder harnesses (codex,claude,opencode, etc.) and supports custom command templates defined in~/.borkweb-skills/config.json. These builders are often launched with relaxed permissions (e.g.,--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox), which is a documented risk inherent to the skill's purpose.\n- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill interacts with multiple local configuration and state files, such as~/.borkweb-skills/config.json,~/.agent-handoffs/, and harness-specific directories like~/.codex/and~/.claude/.
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