ship
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to override standard interactive behavior and safety oversight, stating 'This is a non-interactive, fully automated workflow. Do NOT ask for confirmation at any step' and 'Never stop for... Commit message approval... Auto-fixable review findings'.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically detects and executes test commands and build scripts from the local codebase (e.g., from package.json, Makefiles, or Gemfiles), which may run arbitrary code defined in the repository.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill automatically pushes local source code and commit history to remote servers using
git pushand creates Pull Requests via theghCLI. While this is the intended function, the 'non-interactive' instructions remove the user-in-the-loop verification step for the content being exfiltrated to the remote repository. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an Indirect Prompt Injection surface (Category 8) by ingesting untrusted data from the repository:
- Ingestion points: Reads
checklist.md,TODOS.md, and plan files (fromdocs/plans/,docs/designs/, etc.) in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Minimal boundary markers are present; it only checks the first 20 lines of plan files for relevance before processing.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bashto execute commands,Writeto modify the filesystem, andAgentto dispatch subagents that process the ingested content. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of external file content is described before it is passed to the LLM or subagents.
Audit Metadata