agent-native
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses and references the
aoCLI tool (e.g.,ao agent bundle,ao mcp serve) and includes scripts that execute local shell commands. It also references executing commands on a remote host via SSH (ssh bushido). These operations are consistent with the documented purpose of managing agent deployments in a specific technical environment. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The instructions explicitly warn against bundling sensitive data (PII, holdout sets) into cloud agent definitions, demonstrating an awareness of data privacy constraints in managed environments.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the bundling of external skill files into an agent's system instructions. While this creates a potential surface for indirect injection if a skill file is compromised, the skill itself is a management utility for this architectural pattern.
- Ingestion points:
ao agent bundlestitchesskills/<name>/SKILL.mdinto instructions. - Boundary markers: None explicitly mentioned in the bundling logic.
- Capability inventory:
aoCLI tools (bootstrap, inject, validate, etc.) and potential shell tool access. - Sanitization: Not explicitly documented in the provided snippets.
Audit Metadata