codex-approval
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple terminal-based commands to orchestrate the approval process:
- Uses
tmux list-sessionsandtmux list-panesto identify validator lanes. - Uses
tmux capture-paneto extract transcripts from validator sessions. - Uses
tmux send-keysandatm sendto dispatch requests to other agents. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted plan data and forwards it to another agent without sanitization or strict boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
PLAN,RESEARCH, andSynthesisPacketfiles from the local repository as specified in Phase 1 and 3 of the workflow. - Boundary markers: The prompt template in Phase 3 does not utilize delimiters (e.g., XML tags or triple backticks) or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when interpolating the content of the plans into the request sent to the validator.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to send content to terminal panes (
tmux send-keys) and record results into the filesystem (.agents/council/). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input plan content is performed before it is sent to the Fable/Claude-family reviewer.
Audit Metadata