codex-team
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for using the
codexCLI with flags like--full-autoand-s danger-full-access. These flags grant the agent significant capabilities, including workspace-wide write access or full system access in specific environments. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions recommend the global installation of the
@openai/codexNode.js package. This is a third-party dependency whose security posture is not verified within the skill's context. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The multi-wave execution strategy involves reading the output of previous agents to provide context for subsequent tasks. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious content generated or encountered by an earlier agent could influence the behavior of later agents in the chain.
- Ingestion points: Result files in
.agents/swarm/results/and.agents/codex-team/(as described in theproducesfield and Step 3/5 ofSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the prompt generation examples to isolate summarized content from previous agent outputs.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator uses the
Bashtool to execute shell commands andspawn_agentto create sub-agents. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering of the content read from previous waves is described before it is summarized and injected into new prompts.
- [SAFE]: The skill references configuration and changelog information from the official Anthropics GitHub repository (
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anthropics/claude-code/main/CHANGELOG.md), which is a well-known and trusted source.
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