trace
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill exhibits a command injection surface by interpolating user-provided input (the
<concept>variable) directly into shell commands within the prompts for sub-agents. Examples includegrep -l "<concept>",git log --grep="<concept>", andcass search "<concept>". A malicious user could provide input designed to escape the double quotes and execute arbitrary shell commands. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external, potentially untrusted sources like git history, session transcripts, and documentation files.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through files in
.agents/handoff/,.agents/research/,.agents/learnings/, and.agents/patterns/, as well as outputs from thegitandcassCLI tools. - Boundary markers: The skill fails to use boundary markers or explicit "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when asking sub-agents to process these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool and can write files to the.agents/research/directory. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested content is performed before it is analyzed by the sub-agents or included in the final report.
Audit Metadata