using-gc
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configures the agent to add and interact with an external software registry at
https://registry.gascity.com/registry.tomland performs software package installations using thegc import installcommand. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various CLI commands using
aoandgctools to manage the execution environment. This includesao gc prepare, which writes to$CODEX_HOME/config.tomlto seed trust levels, andtmux capture-paneto inspect runtime state. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface by requiring the agent to monitor and process data from external, potentially untrusted sources.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context from
tmux -L <socket> capture-pane -pt <session>(shell output),gc mail inbox(email messages), and the Gas City supervisor API ($API/runs/<run-id>). - Boundary markers: While the skill advises the agent not to infer completion from prose, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore malicious commands embedded within the captured pane or mail text.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to execute shell commands, interact with network APIs via
curl, and perform file-write operations to configuration paths. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the data ingested from shell panes or emails before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata