validation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various local CLI commands including the
aoutility suite (ao lookup,ao forge,ao metrics) and project-specific commands likemake testorgrepas part of its validation workflow. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically executes command strings (
check_command) loaded from a local configuration file (.agents/rpi/execution-packet.json) during the per-criterion verdict phase. This is an inherent part of its role as a validation orchestrator. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from
ao lookupresults and external scenario files (.agents/holdout/,.agents/specs/) and interpolates them into the agent's context. - Ingestion points:
ao lookupcommand output inSKILL.mdStep 0; files in.agents/holdout/and.agents/specs/in Step 1.8 (referenced inreferences/step-1.8-behavioral-validation.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; data is processed and used as 'known risks' or 'judge context' without explicit delimiters to prevent command or instruction injection.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
ao,grep,make), file system writes (.agents/rpi/phase-3-summary...), and delegation to other skills viaSkill(). - Sanitization: No evidence of escaping or validating the content of lookups or scenario files before they are provided to the agent or evaluator council.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads project state files (e.g.,
.agents/rpi/execution-packet.json) and writes validation summaries. While these actions are intended for reporting, they involve handling sensitive implementation details and execution metadata.
Audit Metadata