modernizing-prs

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub pull requests, including titles, bodies, and diffs, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Pull request metadata and content are fetched via gh pr view and evaluated during the assessment process in references/assessment.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill references shared/external-data.md, which instructs the agent to fence untrusted text with backticks and explicitly label it as untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute git commands (rebase, push) and run local shell scripts included in the skill (prepare-rebase.sh, publish.sh).
  • Sanitization: The shared/external-data.md guide mandates avoiding shell interpolation of untrusted prose and requires reporting but not following any embedded imperatives found in external text.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell scripts and standard git/gh commands to perform its core functionality.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md directs the agent to run scripts/prepare-rebase.sh and scripts/publish.sh within the local repository.
  • Note: The scripts implement defensive measures including input validation for PR identifiers and branch names, and use standard error handling (set -euo pipefail).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 31, 2026, 12:09 AM