running-retros

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data from session transcripts, PR review comments, and issue trackers to find durable learnings.
  • Ingestion points: Transcripts (transcript.jsonl), past agent sessions, and tracker text (issues/PR comments) are identified as primary data sources in references/reading-sources.md.
  • Boundary markers: references/lenses.md requires running analysis passes in a "fresh read-only subagent" and explicitly forbids tool calls within analyzed spans to prevent instructions in the data from being executed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files via scripts/write-target.mjs, perform git operations, file issues using the gh CLI, and execute repository-defined check commands.
  • Sanitization: All untrusted data is passed via files or environment variables as per shared/external-data.md. Target paths and skill names are validated against strict character allowlists and repository containment checks in scripts/write-target.mjs.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands to interact with the repository and external trackers.
  • Evidence: It uses git for status and hashing, gh for issue creation and API access, and a repository-specific "check command" (e.g., linting or tests) during the apply turn as described in references/applying-edits.md.
  • Mitigation: The skill utilizes helper scripts (scripts/resolve-transcript.mjs and scripts/write-target.mjs) to ensure all command arguments are validated and that operations remain within the repository boundaries. Untrusted prose is never interpolated directly into shell strings.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 20, 2026, 06:38 AM