running-retros
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted data from session transcripts, PR review comments, and issue trackers to find durable learnings.
- Ingestion points: Transcripts (
transcript.jsonl), past agent sessions, and tracker text (issues/PR comments) are identified as primary data sources inreferences/reading-sources.md. - Boundary markers:
references/lenses.mdrequires running analysis passes in a "fresh read-only subagent" and explicitly forbids tool calls within analyzed spans to prevent instructions in the data from being executed. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files via
scripts/write-target.mjs, performgitoperations, file issues using theghCLI, and execute repository-defined check commands. - Sanitization: All untrusted data is passed via files or environment variables as per
shared/external-data.md. Target paths and skill names are validated against strict character allowlists and repository containment checks inscripts/write-target.mjs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell commands to interact with the repository and external trackers.
- Evidence: It uses
gitfor status and hashing,ghfor issue creation and API access, and a repository-specific "check command" (e.g., linting or tests) during the apply turn as described inreferences/applying-edits.md. - Mitigation: The skill utilizes helper scripts (
scripts/resolve-transcript.mjsandscripts/write-target.mjs) to ensure all command arguments are validated and that operations remain within the repository boundaries. Untrusted prose is never interpolated directly into shell strings.
Audit Metadata