watching-authored-prs
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub pull request comments, review summaries, and CI logs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via GraphQL queries in
shared/pull-request-comments.md(conversation comments, review bodies, and inline threads) and CI log retrieval inSKILL.md(gh run view --job <id> --log-failed). - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly references
shared/external-data.md, which mandates labeling external text as untrusted and fencing it with backticks to prevent the agent from following embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
gh,git), write files, and commit/push code changes to the user's repository. - Sanitization: Instructions in
shared/external-data.mdforbid interpolating untrusted prose into shell command text, requiring the use of temporary files (--body-file) or environment variables instead. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive local and remote operations using the GitHub CLI (
gh) and Git. - Evidence: Commands include
gh pr view,gh pr checks,gh pr ready,git add,git commit, andgit push. - Security measures: The skill implements 'Branch binding' in
references/ci-fix.mdto ensure that local Git actions correctly target the intended upstream PR branch and prevent unintended pushes to other remotes or branches. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes instructions for the user to install a dependency using a package manager.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mddirects users to runnpx skills@latest add bostonaholic/skills --skill addressing-pr-commentsif the required sub-skill is missing. This refers to the author's own tooling ecosystem.
Audit Metadata