eng-design-doc-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from technical design documents and external model review tool outputs, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
6-design.mdfrom a user-specified artifact directory and captures raw output from external vendor CLIs viaexternal-review.mjs. - Boundary markers: The methodology uses a "fence-length containment rule" and a designated "untrusted-content line" header to isolate external data within
DATAblocks. - Capability inventory: The invoking session uses
Bashfor discovery and review execution, and dispatches a subagent via theAgenttool. The subagent (Explore) is constrained by instruction to read-only tools (Read,Grep,Glob,Skill) to prevent unauthorized modifications. - Sanitization: The instructions require a "paraphrase-only" disposition for external claims and employ "last-verdict-token derivation" to ensure the final verdict status (e.g., APPROVE) is determined by the reviewer's logic rather than injected strings.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the host's Bash environment to execute local scripts and tools as part of the engineering workflow.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains instructions to invokediscover-topic.shandexternal-review.mjsusing the Bash tool, incorporating user-supplied path arguments.
Audit Metadata