team-worktree
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/run-teardown.shscript implements a mechanism that reads and executes arbitrary shell commands from a.teamteardownfile located in the repository's default branch. The script utilizessh -c "$line"to run these commands sequentially. While the skill attempts to mitigate risk by only executing the version of the file found on the default branch (e.g.,origin/main), this remains a powerful dynamic execution vector that could be abused if the repository's main branch is compromised. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's behavior is directed by several external files within the repository environment, creating a surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: The file
docs/plans/<id>/4-repos.mdis parsed to determine which repositories the agent will interact with, and.teamteardownis parsed for shell commands. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" markers when reading these files, relying instead on shell-level escaping.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to create/delete git worktrees, execute arbitrary shell commands (via teardown), and modify repository files.
- Sanitization: The skill includes some input validation, such as refusing values containing single quotes, newlines,
$, or backticks when preparing shell arguments, and using regex-like validation for branch names. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on multiple bash scripts (
add-worktree.sh,run-teardown.sh,sweep-worktrees.sh) that construct and execute shell commands using repository-derived data (branch names, repository paths, PR metadata). The high level of complexity in these shell-based operations increases the risk of command injection if any of the validation steps are bypassed or if unexpected input patterns are encountered during repository metadata processing.
Audit Metadata