bounded-frontend
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation defines the attack surface for indirect prompt injection via the Bounded SDK's data ingestion capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the application context through SDK retrieval methods such as
get,subscribe,runQuery, andfunctions.invokeas documented indocs/sdk-reference.mdanddocs/building-a-webapp.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation repeatedly highlights that all operations are governed by Bounded's server-side policy engine (
policy.json), which enforces rules and invariants at the platform level, providing a security boundary separate from the client code. - Capability inventory: The SDK exposes powerful capabilities for data manipulation, including atomic multi-writes (
setMany), individual document updates (set), and file storage operations (setFile). - Sanitization: The skill emphasizes the use of hosted authentication issuers (
auth.bounded.sh), which prevents the application frontend from directly handling or potentially mishandling sensitive user credentials like email OTP codes. - [SAFE]: The skill provides explicit guidance on security hardening, such as encrypting mobile session stores using the OS keychain (
expo-secure-storeorreact-native-keychain) and providing a specific resolution recipe for a moderate security advisory in a transitive dependency (uuid) within the Solana web3.js stack. - [SAFE]: All external libraries and services referenced (e.g.,
@bounded-sh/client,@bounded-sh/server,expo-*,Privy) are well-known, established tools or official vendor resources from the skill's authoring organization.
Audit Metadata