skills/bounded-sh/skill/openapps/Gen Agent Trust Hub

openapps

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to process external data, such as community-contributed code changes and discussion threads, which represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Community-submitted code-change.diff files and threads in the app's Discussion section (docs/launch-gate.md).
  • Boundary markers: The platform uses automated preflight checks, deployment reports, and safety gate findings to validate configurations (docs/preflight.md).
  • Capability inventory: The agent can invoke platform services (ctx.services.invoke), manage treasury assets, and publish new code releases (docs/capability-ladder.md, docs/lifecycle.md).
  • Sanitization: Mitigations include a human-in-the-loop approval process by owners or token holders, and automated 'Gauntlet' audits that enforce script-src constraints and reproducible builds (docs/launch-gate.md).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions involve the use of the vendor's bounded command-line utility for managing app lifecycles and deployments.
  • Evidence: Execution of commands such as bounded site deploy, bounded oapp preflight, and bounded services search (docs/preflight.md, docs/lifecycle.md).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates interaction with external APIs via a managed payment relay.
  • Evidence: The agent can utilize the X402_FETCH service to interact with third-party APIs, which is controlled by locked egress boundaries and vendor-managed infrastructure (docs/capability-ladder.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 14, 2026, 11:09 PM