vibe-killer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted HTML and CSS content from user-provided sources to perform design analysis and conversion. This content is processed by the agent to infer design intent, creating a surface where hidden instructions in the source code could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads content via direct pastes, local file access, URL fetching, and DOM rendering (documented in
phases/phase-1-forensics.md). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when processing the untrusted input.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell execution for auditing (
grep,wc,tr), file writing for outputting converted code, and external tool invocation via Figma and System MCP servers. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the input HTML/CSS content is specified before analysis or interpolation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches external content from user-provided URLs for forensics and references remote assets from well-known services (e.g., Google Fonts, Tailwind CDN, unpkg, jsDelivr) within the generated code artifacts.
- Evidence:
phases/phase-1-forensics.md(fetching URLs),intake/SYSTEM-INTAKE.md(CDN URLs for tokens and components), andreference/THE-TELLS.md(Tailwind Play CDN). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses standard shell utilities to perform deterministic counts and static analysis on the source code to provide empirical data for its "autopsy" and "receipt" reports.
- Evidence:
phases/phase-1-forensics.mdandphases/phase-4-proof.mdcontain commands usinggrep,sort,uniq,wc, andtrto count hardcoded values and CSS properties.
Audit Metadata