start-an-app
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell commands for project setup, including
npx create-next-app,pnpm install, and file management commands likemkdir,mv, andshopt. It also includes a command to approve binary builds forembedded-postgresviapnpm approve-builds, bypassing default security restrictions.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs various Node.js packages from standard registries, including core frameworks (Next.js), ORMs (Drizzle), and payment integrations (Polar, Stripe).\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to download and add a separate skill from an untrusted source:npx skills add https://github.com/Leonxlnx/taste-skill. This constitutes the execution of remote instructions from an unverified third party.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The agent is tasked with generating and configuring sensitive environment variables, includingBETTER_AUTH_SECRET,OPENROUTER_API_KEY, and payment provider tokens, storing them in a local.envfile.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The design extraction feature inreferences/design.mdrequires the agent to visit user-provided URLs and execute JavaScript to extract computed styles. This presents a vector for Indirect Prompt Injection, where content from a malicious external site could influence the agent's subsequent code generation tasks.\n - Ingestion points: User-provided URL during the project interview phase.\n
- Boundary markers: None identified; the agent is not instructed to isolate or sanitize the data retrieved from the external URL.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has full file-writing, command execution, and code generation capabilities within the project directory.\n
- Sanitization: The skill does not implement validation or filtering for the style data and screenshots retrieved from external websites.
Audit Metadata