claude-devfleet
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from external mission reports to influence the agent's next steps and user reporting.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
get_report(mission_id)and user-provided prompts inplan_projectandcreate_mission. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat mission reports as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions within them.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates powerful capabilities including spawning parallel agents (
dispatch_mission) with access to the local filesystem and git repositories via isolated worktrees. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of mission report content before it is processed by the orchestrating agent.
Audit Metadata