cc-workflow-ai-editor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and acts upon existing workflow data.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves the current state of a workflow using the
get_current_workflowtool from thecc-workflow-studioMCP server as specified inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not include boundary markers or explicit warnings to the agent to ignore or isolate natural language instructions that might be embedded within the ingested workflow JSON fields (e.g., in node names or data labels).
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to modify the workflow canvas and execute changes through the
apply_workflowandupdate_nodestools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, schema validation, or content filtering mentioned in the instructions to handle potentially malicious content within the ingested workflow data.
Audit Metadata