openscad

Warn

Audited by Socket on Sep 13, 2026

4 alerts found:

Securityx2Anomalyx2
SecurityMEDIUM
scripts/validate.js

The code is a legitimate-looking OpenSCAD validation utility, but it contains a high-severity arbitrary JavaScript execution risk because eval() processes values derived from the input file. It also has a command-injection risk from interpolating an untrusted file path into execSync shell commands. These are security vulnerabilities and should be fixed by parsing literals without eval and by using execFileSync/spawn with an argument array. No clear malware behavior such as data theft, persistence, or network exfiltration is present in the shown fragment.

Confidence: 97%Severity: 86%
AnomalyLOW
scripts/analyze-geometry.js

The code appears to be a legitimate OpenSCAD geometry analysis CLI and shows no indicators of intentional malware. However, it contains a medium-severity command-injection risk because the user-controlled filePath is inserted into a shell command executed by execSync. Use spawn/spawnSync with an argument array or properly avoid shell interpretation, and add validation and size limits for STL parsing. Malformed input can also cause denial-of-service conditions through unchecked binary STL triangle counts.

Confidence: 98%Severity: 62%
SecurityMEDIUM
scripts/test-design.js

The code is a legitimate-looking OpenSCAD test runner and contains no clear malware indicators or data-exfiltration behavior. It has two important code-execution risks: unsafe shell command construction in runWithParams() and eval() of SCAD-derived expressions. It should use spawnSync/execFile with an argument array, validate parameter names and values, and replace eval with a restricted numeric-expression parser. The fragment is syntactically invalid as displayed because of a malformed string literal.

Confidence: 98%Severity: 78%
AnomalyLOW
scripts/check-bed-fit.js

The code does not show evidence of malware, data theft, persistence, cryptomining, or backdoor behavior. It has a security-relevant command-injection vulnerability because the user-controlled SCAD filename is interpolated into a shell command without robust escaping. Use execFileSync() with an argument array, validate the path, and perform temporary-file cleanup in a finally block. Confidence is high because the vulnerable data flow is explicit.

Confidence: 98%Severity: 68%
Audit Metadata
Analyzed At
Sep 13, 2026, 11:22 PM
Package URL
pkg:socket/skills-sh/brentvatne%2Fdesign-3d-prints%2Fopenscad%2F@3029b466514aa55882c6baf27e5e0f8553562a92593babe9a150097946a366d4