file-nav
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill describes how to install the
fdtool using official and well-known package managers, including Arch Linux'spacman, Ubuntu'sapt, macOS'sbrew, and the Rustcargoregistry. These are trusted software distribution channels. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions mention the
sudocommand for system package installation (pacmanandapt). This is standard procedure for user-initiated software installation on Linux-based systems and does not represent an attempt by the skill to silently escalate privileges. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill demonstrates the use of the
Bashtool to runfdcommands, including the-xflag for executing operations (such asrm,wc, orchmod) on search results. These examples illustrate legitimate and intended functionality of the tool for file management tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill allows an agent to ingest untrusted filesystem data (filenames and paths), creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Output from the
fdtool, specifically filenames and directory paths (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None present.
- Capability inventory:
Bash(command execution),Read(file inspection), andTask(task management) (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: None specified.
- This vulnerability surface is inherent to the primary purpose of a file navigation skill and is documented here for completeness within the context of the skill's intended operation.
Audit Metadata