pst-mail-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from email senders, subjects, and bodies which may contain adversarial instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through tools in
scripts/pst_client.pysuch asget_latest_emails,search_emails_by_subject, andextract_pst. - Boundary markers: None identified. The instructions do not provide delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within the emails.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write files to the host machine (via
draft_email --out-path) and perform network operations to a local MCP server. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering before external email data is interpolated into the agent's context.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the extraction of sensitive mailbox information, including full email dumps and contact lists, transmitting this data from the host machine to an internal network endpoint at
http://host.openshell.internal:9003/mcp. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The troubleshooting section in
SKILL.mdinstructs the user or agent to install thefastmcppackage from the Python Package Index (PyPI) if dependencies are missing. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of a Python script (
scripts/pst_client.py) to bridge communication between the sandbox and the host-based MCP server, exposing host-side file system operations like saving email drafts.
Audit Metadata