ad-delayer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local bash scripts (
bria_delayer_client.sh) andcurlcommands to interact with the Bria AI API.\n - Evidence:\n
bria_delayer_client.shimplements functions to submit jobs, poll for status, and download results.\n- User-provided prompts are escaped using
sed 's/\\/\\\\/g; s/"/\\"/g'before inclusion in JSON payloads.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Extracted image layers and manifest files are downloaded from the vendor's API.\n - Evidence:\n
- The
bria_delayer_downloadfunction inbria_delayer_client.shfetches assets fromengine.prod.bria-api.com.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external image content which may contain embedded text, creating an indirect injection surface.\n - Ingestion points: User-provided image files and URLs processed via the
bria_delayerfunction.\n - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters are defined for extracted text data in the manifest processing.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill performs network requests (
curl) and local file operations (mkdir,mv,printf).\n - Sanitization: Filenames derived from extracted layer IDs are sanitized using
tr -cd 'A-Za-z0-9._-'to prevent path traversal.
Audit Metadata