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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by accepting and processing user-provided natural language guidance and image content which are then transmitted to the Bria AI service. \n- Ingestion points: Natural language guidance provided via the
--promptargument and the input source image (either a local file or a URL) in thebria_resizeandbria_resize_submitfunctions. \n- Boundary markers: There are no specialized delimiters or system instructions used to separate user-provided data from the API request context or to instruct the model to ignore instructions embedded within the data. \n- Capability inventory: The skill utilizescurlfor network requests to Bria AI's endpoints and performs file writes for both credential storage (~/.bria/credentials) and output image management. \n- Sanitization: While the shell client script performs character-level escaping for JSON compatibility, it does not perform semantic sanitization to prevent malicious instructions within thepromptor image content from potentially influencing the behavior of the Bria AI service.
Audit Metadata