youtube-summarizer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the installation of an external dependency from an untrusted source:
https://github.com/kimtaeyoon83/mcp-server-youtube-transcript.git. The instructions direct the agent to clone this repository and executenpm install && npm run build, which involves executing arbitrary code from a remote repository during the build process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands for its core functionality, including the use of
node -eto run inline JavaScript. This pattern provides a significant attack surface if video ID or language parameters are manipulated. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructs the agent to create directories and install software within the
/root/directory structure (e.g.,/root/clawd/). Accessing or modifying files in/root/typically requires elevated privileges, which the agent is encouraged to assume. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes JavaScript at runtime using the
node -eflag to bridge the shell environment with the installed MCP server. It passes variables into the script context, which could lead to code injection if not carefully handled. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes functionality to send local files from the filesystem to an external Telegram channel using the
message --action sendcommand. When combined with the ability to read system-level data, this provides a mechanism for unauthorized data removal. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection via external video content.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted transcript data is fetched from YouTube and loaded into the agent's context in
SKILL.md(Step 2 and 3). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks delimiters or safety instructions to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within the transcript text.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell execution, file writes in privileged directories, and remote messaging platforms (Telegram).
- Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the transcript text before it is processed for summarization or saved to the filesystem.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata