personal-opsec
Personal OpSec — Audit One Operator's Own Security Setup
Every other skill in this catalog audits an organization, a codebase, or infrastructure. This one audits a person: the founder, solo operator, or small-team admin whose laptop, email, phone number, and password manager are the real root of trust for the whole stack. If their email falls to a SIM swap, it doesn't matter how good the IAM policies are.
This is not security-awareness or phishing training. No quizzes, no "think before you click" content. The agent checks the person's actual state — on the local machine where it can, by asking where it can't — and produces a prioritized gap report in the same finding/disposition vocabulary as the audit skills, ready for finding-triage.
The baseline is Karpathy's 15-control list (via Andrej Karpathy's digital security checklist), plus the operator-critical items it skips and the AI-agent layer it predates. Products named below are examples of a control, not endorsements; any tool that provides the control counts.
Cross-references: secrets-audit for API keys and tokens on disk that coding agents can read; agent-supply-chain-audit for MCP server and agent-extension trust; prompt-injection for personal and inbox assistants that read untrusted mail; iam-audit for the org-level MFA and access policy this person administers; breach-patterns for the phishing and account-takeover patterns behind these controls; finding-triage for dispositions on each gap; osint-recon if the user wants to see what's public about themselves.
Authorization: consent and scope (before anything else)
- Only the person being audited runs this, on their own accounts and their own machine. Confirm that at the start. If the user asks to audit a co-founder, employee, partner, or anyone else, stop: that person runs it themselves, with their own consent. Refuse to profile, enumerate, or assess someone else's personal security, accounts, devices, or exposure without their explicit consent — that's surveillance or pre-attack recon, not opsec.
- On a work machine managed by an employer, local checks are fine, but don't attempt to read or change MDM/EDR configuration.
- Read-only. The agent never changes a setting, enables a feature, installs anything, or logs into an account. It reports; the user fixes.
- Never read secret values. The agent doing this audit is itself an AI agent with file access — exactly the exposure Part C measures. Check existence, file permissions, and match counts; never print a token, key, recovery code, or password into the transcript. If the user pastes one, tell them to rotate it.