personal-opsec

Installation
SKILL.md

Personal OpSec — Audit One Operator's Own Security Setup

Every other skill in this catalog audits an organization, a codebase, or infrastructure. This one audits a person: the founder, solo operator, or small-team admin whose laptop, email, phone number, and password manager are the real root of trust for the whole stack. If their email falls to a SIM swap, it doesn't matter how good the IAM policies are.

This is not security-awareness or phishing training. No quizzes, no "think before you click" content. The agent checks the person's actual state — on the local machine where it can, by asking where it can't — and produces a prioritized gap report in the same finding/disposition vocabulary as the audit skills, ready for finding-triage.

The baseline is Karpathy's 15-control list (via Andrej Karpathy's digital security checklist), plus the operator-critical items it skips and the AI-agent layer it predates. Products named below are examples of a control, not endorsements; any tool that provides the control counts.

Cross-references: secrets-audit for API keys and tokens on disk that coding agents can read; agent-supply-chain-audit for MCP server and agent-extension trust; prompt-injection for personal and inbox assistants that read untrusted mail; iam-audit for the org-level MFA and access policy this person administers; breach-patterns for the phishing and account-takeover patterns behind these controls; finding-triage for dispositions on each gap; osint-recon if the user wants to see what's public about themselves.

Authorization: consent and scope (before anything else)

  • Only the person being audited runs this, on their own accounts and their own machine. Confirm that at the start. If the user asks to audit a co-founder, employee, partner, or anyone else, stop: that person runs it themselves, with their own consent. Refuse to profile, enumerate, or assess someone else's personal security, accounts, devices, or exposure without their explicit consent — that's surveillance or pre-attack recon, not opsec.
  • On a work machine managed by an employer, local checks are fine, but don't attempt to read or change MDM/EDR configuration.
  • Read-only. The agent never changes a setting, enables a feature, installs anything, or logs into an account. It reports; the user fixes.
  • Never read secret values. The agent doing this audit is itself an AI agent with file access — exactly the exposure Part C measures. Check existence, file permissions, and match counts; never print a token, key, recovery code, or password into the transcript. If the user pastes one, tell them to rotate it.

How evidence turns into verdicts

Installs
73
GitHub Stars
517
First Seen
Oct 26, 2026