load-mem
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon data from external project documents and search tool results, which constitutes an attack surface for instructions embedded within that data.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read project documentation (
docs/*.sdoc) and retrieve search results fromMagic Contextandclaude-memtools. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or specific safety warnings to prevent the agent from following malicious instructions found within the retrieved text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities to search, expand context, and write/save memory (
ctx_search,ctx_expand,ctx_memory,ctx_note,claude_mem_search,migrate-mem,save-mem), which could be misdirected by poisoned memory content. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any validation or filtering mechanisms for the external content before it is integrated into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata