omnivoice
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Instructs the user to clone an external code repository from a third-party GitHub account (
github.com/debpalash/OmniVoice-Studio) and executeuv syncto set up the local environment and install dependencies. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches configuration and large machine learning model assets (approximately 2.4 GB) from HuggingFace's official repository (
k2-fsa/OmniVoice) during the initial synthesis operation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Provides management scripts (
scripts/start-backend.sh,scripts/stop-backend.sh) that execute shell commands to manage the local FastAPI backend, including starting the server withuvicornand terminating processes usingkill. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Includes a utility (
scripts/record-reference.sh) for macOS that accesses the system microphone viaffmpegto record reference audio for voice cloning. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
generate_speechtool interpolates user-supplied text into the synthesis engine without defined boundary markers or sanitization, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. (1) Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through thetextparameter in thegenerate_speechtool; (2) Boundary markers: None identified in instructions; (3) Capability inventory: Local command execution, file system access, and microphone access; (4) Sanitization: No validation or escaping of external content is documented.
Audit Metadata