phronesis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data in the form of interview transcripts and uploaded documents, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points:
stages/intake.pycontainslog_interviewandingest_documentmethods that capture external text and file paths for processing.\n - Boundary markers: The ingestion logic does not currently utilize explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore nested prompts within the source data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write to the local filesystem for persisting engagement journals, rendering markdown deliverables, and populating extraction queues and knowledge graph stubs (
core/engagement.py,core/orchestrator.py,core/extraction/pipeline.py).\n - Sanitization: While a comprehensive anonymization pipeline (
core/anonymize.py) strips personal and tenant markers, it does not perform sanitization of content for adversarial instructions.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The IP extraction pipeline performs dynamic module loading by modifyingsys.pathto include a local path derived from the user's home directory. Additionally, the documentation suggests running remote scripts via npx during installation.\n - Evidence: In
core/extraction/pipeline.py, the_bookkeeping_modulefunction appends~/broomva/skills/bookkeeping/scriptstosys.pathand attempts to import thebookkeepingmodule.\n - Evidence:
README.mdprovides an installation command usingnpx skills add broomva/skills.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation and build configurations reference external repositories and resources owned by the author context.\n - Evidence:
README.mdandSKILL.mdreferencegithub.com/broomva/skillsfor cloning and methodology reference.
Audit Metadata