threads-keyword-search

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Command injection vulnerability in the search query instruction.
  • The skill's instructions provide a template eval "$(python scripts/extract-search-results.py '{keyword}' --filter {filter})" which is intended to be executed using a shell tool.
  • Because the {keyword} parameter is sourced from user input and interpolated directly into a bash command, an attacker can provide search terms containing shell metacharacters (e.g., $(...) or backticks) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Unsafe dynamic code execution pattern.
  • The skill uses a pattern where a Python script generates Javascript code at runtime, which is then executed via shell eval. This multi-layered execution of dynamically generated code is highly susceptible to injection attacks and bypasses standard input validation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface through the ingestion of external Threads content.
  • Ingestion points: The skill extracts search results directly from the document.documentElement.innerHTML of Threads search pages via the scripts/extract-search-results.py script.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to treat the extracted content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent environment has access to powerful tools including browser-act and bash, which increases the risk of successful exploitation if malicious instructions are found in the scraped data.
  • Sanitization: The extraction logic lacks any sanitization or filtering of the text and username fields, allowing external content to be placed directly into the agent's context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 4, 2026, 05:54 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — threads-keyword-search