ask-internal

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The search workflow described in Step 2 templates shell commands by interpolating keywords directly into grep calls (e.g., grep -rni ... '<keyword>' ...). If the agent extracts keywords containing shell metacharacters or single quotes from a user's question, it could lead to arbitrary command execution via the Bash tool.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the codebase and submodules to provide answers and suggest executable commands.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads documentation from .internal-docs/ and source code from packages/, scripts/, .config/, and .github/.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat content within these files as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool and is explicitly instructed to offer execution of commands found within the processed files.
  • Sanitization: The workflow does not include steps to sanitize, escape, or validate the content extracted from files before presenting it to the user for execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 14, 2026, 12:36 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ask-internal